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0. Abstract 
This study lay the foundation for merging two parallelly studied strains of academic literature 
asset risk factors and systemic banking risk, in order to create a measure incorporating credit 
risk in the banking sector and banking sector interconnectedness. The theoretical work 
accumulates to a proposed two factor model including a novel measure of interconnected 
credit risk and the traditional market factor. Despite the unsatisfactory statistical results, the 
theoretical foundation remains robust and the literature combining these twin brothers in the 
academic field of research is by a large unexplored. Thus, this paper’s theoretical 
development is significant. 
1. Intro 
Academia has predominantly focused on ad hoc financial ratios and simple balance sheet items 
when researching asset prices, naturally due to ease of data accessibility. Consequently, asset 
pricing models have shed light on a variety of risk factors allowing practitioners to better 
analyse exposures to risk and given some evidence as to the origin of this risk. However, it has 
not to a satisfactory extent explained the origin of these factors relating them to unique sources 
of fundamental  risk. Moreover, a vast number of studies have, in an attempt to fundamentally 
link the factors to economic variables, suggested credit risk to be influential. This research is 
aiming at combining credit risk of the banking sector weighted by interconnectedness. Thereby 
combining two distinct, though related, branches in the academia using a recently 
acknowledged measure of credit risk in the banking sector adjusting it to accommodate for a 
measure of interconnectedness. In awareness of the dispute among leading researchers with 
regards to factor models being consistent with efficient market hypothesis or not (Fama, 1970; 
Fama, 1991; Shiller, 2003), this paper is not aiming to make conclusive arguments on whether 
markets are efficient nor inefficient. Ultimately, this paper aim to present evidence describing 
the systemic risk of the banking sector in an asset pricing model incorporating credit risk and 
interconnectedness. 
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2. Literature review 
Modern asset pricing models were first developed by the work of Markowitz (1959), Treynor 
(1961) Sharpe (1964), Lindtner (1965:a; 1965:b), Mossin (1966) and Tobin (1958) known as 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”). CAPM present the expected return of an asset as 
a direct relationship between the beta and excess market return where, by definition, beta 
captures the systematic exposure to risk in its entirety. The model has been adopted by financial 
practitioners and greatly contributed to our understanding of asset return structures. It is, 
however, subject to limiting and unrealistic assumptions. Studies relaxing one or more 
assumptions have been presented in the literature suggesting a variety of alterations to CAPM 
(see Lindtner, 1969; Pratt, 1967; Black, Jensen and Scholes, 1972; Black, 1972). Even if 
academia presents compelling evidence rejecting the accuracy of CAPM it remains a powerful 
tool to assess and explain asset return structures although not presenting the whole truth. Fama 
and French (1993) published perhaps the most influential paper since the development of 
CAPM linking risk factors common to the bond market and equity market. The market, Book-
to-Market equity (“BM”) and size factor (see Banz, 1981) are included in the asset pricing 
model where the market portfolio is found to also capture variations common for both stock 
returns and the two term structures. Thereby linking return structures in debt and equity 
markets. 
Even though Fama and French (1995) argue for BM to proxy profitability, different competitive 
structures, products and customers will undoubtedly alter industrial characteristics including 
profit margins. Fama-French (1992) find a close relation between leverage and the BM factor, 
thus, suggesting BM might be associated to Chan and Chen’s (1991) distress risk. However, 
the authors do not rule out the possibility for capturing irrational behaviour. Regardless, 
negligence of industry specific characteristics, credit markets altering the foundation of 
profitability and source of funding are not fundamentally caused by accounting values or market 
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valuations given the reactive nature to economic events. On the contrary, economic shocks to 
industry specific assets or banking sector likely to drive asset return structures. Thus, the 
criticism is not that BM does not capture variation in stock returns, merely the lack of 
economically fundamental rational incorporated in the factor. Small businesses have in the past 
evidently yielded an abnormal return compared to large firms (Banz 1981). Thus, small firm 
investors must be exposed to risk uniquely priced in the market compared to investing in large, 
established firms. However, the size factor is not linked to a fundamental economic risk factor. 
For example it does not consider how influenced each sorted portfolio is by “fallen angels” or 
young, innovative companies (Chan and Chen, 1991). Thereby ignoring fundamental 
differences in the sample population as companies in sorted in the same sub sample might act 
independently of each other regardless of size. Furthermore, a legacy of large, failing firms is 
that their capital structure might remain the same, thus, are more exposed to tighter credit supply 
in the market. Consequently, one would expect small size risk premium to originate from factors 
relating to credit risk contrary to a value weighted market factor heavily dependent on 
successful, large firms (Chan and Chen, 1991). Therefore, it is evident that although size and 
BM have been found to possess financial distress information in the past literature later studies 
questions this. Fama and French (2008) accept the limitations of their three-factor model in 
particular with regards to momentum, financial distress and net stock issuance1. 
Of other factors presented by academia, momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) is the most 
puzzling. Avramov et al. (2007) find that the momentum is in fact exclusive for samples 
characterising high credit risk. Their portfolios sorted by momentum reveal, in the subsamples 
of both extremes, all companies are of the lowest or second to lowest credit quality by rank. 
Importantly, the authors find momentum as a measure of credit rating rather than information 
                                                          
1 See Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1995; Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Daniel and Titman, 2006; 
Pontiff and Woodgate, 2008 for research on net stock issuance as this is beyond the scope of this research.  
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uncertainty as momentum across credit groups are not explained by information uncertainty. 
Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) find that momentum returns are also strongly linked to 
business cycles. The authors argue momentum only to occur during economic expansion 
whereas in recession the effect disappears. Therefore, momentum might be capturing a credit 
risk premium.  
Credit risk in various measures is subject to a vast academic literature studies (Duffie and 
Singleton, 1997; Altman and Saunders, 1998). Vassalou and Xing (2004) are, however, first to 
use Merton’s (1974) option pricing model to study how default risk increases the cost of debt 
financing for individual firms as the respective default risk increase. Thus, as distance to default 
increase cost of debt financing should increase for all firms. Although market capitalisation is 
directly impacting the measure of default risk, it is not obvious as to what extent return structure 
is driven by default risk given the subordinate nature of equity to debt. If default risk is 
sufficiently high, a favourable change in default risk might not get reflected in expected cash 
flow attributable to equity holder. On the contrary, an adverse change in default risk for a 
sufficiently low default risk might not get reflected in pricing the value of equity. Moreover, 
the traditional default spread is arguably not actually capturing default risk directly as systemic 
market risk is very pronounced (Elton, 2001; cited in Vassalou and Xing, 2004). Dichev (1998) 
finds firms with high bankruptcy risk do not return a premium on this risk. Moreover, high 
bankruptcy risk is associated with high BM, however, the extreme high bankruptcy risk is 
related to low BM. Default risk is to be associated with both extremes when sorting portfolios 
is also in accordance with Avramov et al. (2007) discovery when studying the momentum 
factor. Furthermore, Pereira and Rua (2018) present evidence on how distance to default in the 
banking sector is linked to credit supply to the wider economy and bankruptcy filings. The 
authors provide evidence specifically capturing a measure of financial distress for the banking 
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sector as opposed to the wider economy and thereby specify the effects of changes in 
creditworthiness of the sector on the wider economy.  
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) introduce a model in which lenders have to incur losses on their 
loans in the case of debt issuance not being secured. This distinction of debt highlights an 
interesting aspect of credit effects on firms as in a deteriorating market, high leverage can create 
a destructive spiral of reducing free cash flows and collateral value of assets. Moreover, if one 
firm in the industry experience the value of their assets is decreasing, the whole industry is 
likely experiencing the same, thereby enhancing the price pressure on firms in need of 
liquidating assets. Firm specific events can cause firms to face unsustainable levels of debt and 
therefore fail. However, only economic shock to the industry can deteriorate asset values to the 
extent that additional pressure on asset prices is experienced. If an adverse shock to credit 
supply is imposed in isolation, asset value of the borrowing industry is arguably not impacted 
directly. However, highly leveraged companies dependent on rolling over debt will face 
difficulties threatening to reduce industry output. Because industry assets are unaffected, firms 
with a conservative debt burden or new entrants can pursue acquisitions of the struggling firms 
mitigating output disruption and negative ripple effects in the market. This is also true for banks 
as proposed by Acharya (2009) where failure of one bank can have two opposing effects. 
Firstly, spill over effects as reduction in total supply of funds are reduced impacting funds 
available for investments. Secondly, remaining banks with financial and strategic capacity can 
exploit the situation by expansion. Nevertheless, the author finds the negative effects to exceed 
the positive supporting the argument of industrial asset return correlations and the literature on 
contagion.  
Contagion in the banking sector is a central topic in the literature on systemic risk 
predominantly studied in parallel to asset pricing models. Kaufman (1994) argues contagion is 
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more likely in the banking sector and that failure of a bank has higher potential to adversely 
affect the wider economy due to its vital role in facilitating credit funding the economy. Firstly, 
due to the mismatch between long-term lending and short-term funding of banks adverse 
changes in cost of funds will spread faster in the financial sector (Kaufman, 1994). Secondly, 
industry specific shocks are more likely in the banking sector compared to other industries due 
to lack of information by creditors (depositors). Hence, contagion is assumed to spread wider 
within the industry for adverse shocks. Past research suggests similarity among lending 
portfolios is a crucial source of information contagion (Diamond, 1984; Calomiris and Kahn, 
1991). However, it is not found to significantly impact bankruptcy rates historically, rather 
incapable management, small and undiversified banks and restrictive Fed policies (Kaufman, 
1994). Lastly, due to lower than non-bank capital ratios and the economic importance of 
deposits, adverse shocks to banks might logically result in higher creditor losses. The economic 
importance of deposits is natural due to it predominantly being held privately by a majority of 
people in the economy and represents the most liquid part of consumer wealth. If losses are 
incurred on deposits, this will spill over to consumption in the following period, thus, other 
industries are most likely to experience a lagged adverse effect in sales (Kaufman, 1994).  
Contagion can appear in three channels (Furfine, 2003). Firstly, ripple effects in payments 
systems or interbank lending markets. Freixas et al. (2000) studies the interbank structures with 
regards to lending among banks and how central banks facilitate liquidity in this market. The 
authors find that interbank lending reduce cost of holding liquid assets under normal market 
conditions. However, the structural flow of funds might also reduce incentives for an inefficient 
bank to fail as it can gain access to funding from the interbank credit lines. Thus, the interbank 
lending market reduces incentives for discipline. Freixas et al. (2000) suggest this is a reason 
for central banks to intervene by regulating the market. However, if appropriate measures of 
interconnectedness can be incorporated in a systemic credit risk factor in an asset pricing model 
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the market can effectively price the fluctuations in interconnectedness. Thereby, discipline is 
reinstated in the market without reducing the benefits of the interbank lending market. 
Secondly, exposure to the same failing or non-performing asset specific to an industry might 
cause banks to face difficulties simultaneously (Furfine, 2003; Aharony and Swary, 1983). The 
characteristically similarity in lending portfolios of banks will expose these respective banks to 
the same industry specific assets (Acharya, 2009). Therefore, in accordance with Kiyotaki and 
Moore (1997), if the industry in question experiences an adverse shock in its ability to generate 
cash flows or if collateral value of the asset diminished, it has the potential to incur losses on 
the lenders as well. Acharya (2009) finds correlation of banking assets increasing the incentives 
to trade away this risk, thus, spreading the banking risk to other financial sectors. Thirdly, 
uncertainty of how single credit events can spread through the financial markets. Furfine (2003) 
suggests the first origin of contagion likely is not sufficient to describe a systemic threat, 
although the uncertainty during a single credit event might exacerbate the magnitude. Hence, 
lack of knowledge or experience can unsettle markets sufficiently resulting in contagion. 
Acharya (2009) argues that this information contagion effect will incentivise banks to engage 
in correlating investments, increase exposure to similar assets, to limit the additional cost of 
bad news to other banks. Chen (1999) present a model describing how incentives of informed 
depositors are to withdraw before information is reveald in the case where the news of another 
bank’s failing is spreading due to uninformed depositors knowingly are at disadvantage and 
will therefore act early. Therefore, credit conditions of individual banks must be considered in 
relation to the banking system when evaluating systemic credit risk. 
Ultimately, banks have been unaware or underestimated the true effects of interconnectedness. 
Cifuentes et al. (2005) suggest individual financial institutions are not incorporating the external 
effects it has on other firms. Hence, the optimal amount of liquid assets held by the institution 
might exceed its actual holdings from a systemic point of view. This is evident in Acharya and 
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Skeie (2011) where banks are shown to pay excessive premiums for liquidity in times of crisis. 
Additionally, Cifuentes et al. (2005) contend regulations, particularly minimum capital 
requirements, might even have an undesirable spill over effect as assets are marked to market 
introducing channels for contagion. On the contrary, the authors argue that liquidity 
requirements can potentially mitigate contagion risk substituting the need for capital buffers. 
Furthermore, Cifuentes et al. (2005) argues that banking interconnectedness and the contagion 
is in fact not solely credit risk, merely the interaction of credit risk, market risk and counterparty 
risk and academia have in recent times published several methods for how to measure this 
complex interaction. Cai et al. (2018) present a measure for interconnectedness by correlating 
lending exposures. They find diversification of lending portfolio to be the primary driver of 
banking interconnectedness. By correctly pricing interconnectedness when measuring credit 
risk of the banking sector, incentives for banks to engage in risk-shifting activities and 
correlated investment strategies have the possibility to decrease regulatory subsidies. This is in 
accordance with Rochet and Tirole’s (1996) argument where centralised government 
monitoring is offsetting the benefits of having a decentralised lending industry monitoring each 
other. The authors argue in a peer-monitoring system banks’ capital should shift from the 
current short-term funding focus to more long-term focus as banks are responsible for any loss 
incurred by interbank linkages. However, introducing market discipline through pricing and 
sharing the risk among market participants can also have adverse effects. The argument for 
pricing interconnectedness will not close the three above-mentioned channels of contagion, 
rather mitigate moral hazard issues of exploiting governmental subsidies. In other words, 
pricing interconnectedness can at best mitigate too-big-to-fail or too-significant-to-fail 
problems by reducing governmental interaction in failing banks shifting cost of default from 
tax payers to the industry.  
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Credit risk factor 
The credit risk factor (“CRF”) originate from the banking factor presented by Pereira and Rua 
(2018), where the distance to default (“DD”) of commercial banks are shown to be a priced risk 
factor when controlling for the market beta. However, this study applies some adjustments to 
their banking factor. Among others, the banking system is defined as the globally systemically 
significant banks receding in the US rather than all commercial banks and weighted by banks’ 
interconnectedness contrary to size. Lastly, while the banking factor is defined as the periodical 
change in DD, the CRF is also taking into consideration the previous period DD.  
3.2. Interconnectedness 
Interconnectedness weights are based on Cai et al. (2018) creating proxies of banks’ lending 
portfolios using the loan facilities originated by each respective bank split by industry of the 
borrowing company. This follows three steps where the first is computing the distance between 
each bank monthly. All loan facilities are assigned to each respective lead credit arranger. If 
there are multiple lead credit arrangers, or unidentified, total loan facility is split in equal 
proportion to each lending bank. All facilities are then linked to a borrowing company before 
the corresponding two-digit SIC code is used to distinguish the lending exposures by industry. 
Unlike Cai et al. (2018), this article will not divide the US market into geographic locations. 
All facilities are split as per issuing month by bank before each banks’ loan issuance is summed 
for the past 12 months per industry on a rolling basis. Following, the weight for each banks’ 
loan issuance per industry per rolling 12 months is computed. The distance between each bank’s 
lending portfolio, denoted by l, is defined as the sum of all squared differences by industrial 
facility origination, denoted by j, per month multiplied with 
1
√2
 in order to standardise the scores 
between [0,1].  
 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑖,𝑘,𝑡) =
1
√2
× √∑ (𝑙(𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) − 𝑙(𝑘,𝑗,𝑡))2
𝐽
𝑗=1            (1) 
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Second step is to compute each individual bank’s interconnectedness score, where the sum of 
all interconnectedness scores equals the bank system’s interconnectedness levels. The 
interconnectedness of each bank i is computed as; 
𝐼(𝑖,𝑘,𝑡) = (1 − ∑ 𝑥(𝑘,𝑡) × 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑖,𝑘,𝑡)) × 100          (2) 
Where x is the weight of the opposing bank relative to all banks identified in the system based 
on their total assets and k is other banks in the system. Lastly, the CRF weights are computed 
as the simple proportionate contribution to the systemic interconnectedness by each bank 
defined by 
𝑤(𝑖,𝑡) =
𝐼(𝑖,𝑡)
∑ 𝐼(𝑡)
           (3) 
3.3. Composition of CRF 
Similar to Pereira and Rua (2018), the DD is based on Merton’s (1974) model. The point of 
default is defined as assets equal debt. Most prudent would be to use the market value of debt, 
however, accounting data is used as it is easier obtainable. Consequently, debt is equal to total 
liabilities reported on a quarterly basis. Market capitalisation is on the contrary readily 
available. Accordingly, asset value is equal to the sum of total liabilities and market 
capitalisation. Thus, both equity and debt holders’ continuous claim to each banks’ assets are 
taken into consideration when computing the DD. Further, the drift is computed based on the 
monthly log returns from the past 12 months and on a rolling basis. The volatility is adjusted 
according to Bharath and Shumway (2008) where  
𝜎(𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡,𝑡) = 0.05 + 0.25 × 𝜎(𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡)          (4) 
and computed on a rolling basis using the past 12 months market capitalisation fluctuations.  
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝐷𝑡 = ∑
(ln(
𝐴(𝑖,𝑡)
𝐷(𝑖,𝑡)
)+(𝑟(𝑖,𝑡)−(
𝜎(𝑖,𝑡)
2
2
))×𝑇)×𝑤(𝑖,𝑡)
𝜎(𝑖,𝑡)×√𝑇
𝐼
𝑖=1           (5) 
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𝐶𝑅𝐹𝑡 =
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝐷𝑡
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝐷𝑡−1
− 1          (6) 
Lastly, in order to limit outlier problems when DD is approximating zero, the CRF range is 
capped to ± two times the mean from zero. This is only adjusting for 15 out of 336 data points, 
thereby deemed reasonable and not impacting the economic interpretations of the results.   
3.3.1. Interpretation of CRF 
The economic interpretation of CRF is naturally close to the banking factor by Pereira and Rua 
(2018). Their paper provides evidence on how credit supply to non-financial is affected by DD 
of the banking sector whereas demand for credit is unrelated to the financial soundness of the 
banking sector. New to academic literature is the inclusion of interconnectedness allowing CRF 
to emphasis the risk of contagion to the financial system. Although Cai et al. (2018) describe 
large banks in general as more interconnected due to their inability to differentiate their 
syndicated lending base, this interconnectedness weight is more nuanced in comparison to asset 
data. DD of each bank will shed light on the financial state of one lender, whereas the 
interconnectedness of the bank is describing a specific bank’s importance in relation to other 
lenders. Nevertheless, asset size remains a decisive factor when weighting aggregate DD 
because interconnectedness weights are directly dependent on size. Moreover, CRF is by 
definition the percentage change from past period to the current period, whereas the banking 
factor is the change from one period to the next. Thus, CRF is designed to distinguish between 
relatively modest changes in good times as less important contrary to changes bad states, which 
will be enhanced. The logic being investors cares more about the credit risk when bad turn 
worse compared to when good states turn a little less good (Allen and Gale, 2005; He and 
Krishnamurthy, 2013).  
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3.3.2. Causality 
The rolling loan origination with two lags yields the highest correlation to Adjusted DD (Table 
1). The coefficient of 22.25 for the loan origination is significant, p-value = 0.0275, and 
insignificant alpha. Therefore, increase in lending activities appear to be positively related to 
DD. Generally, strong financial institutions are associated with good states of the economy and 
inversely with banks’ tightening credit standards (Pereira and Rua, 2018).  Thus, Adjusted DD 
is a proxy for good states in the economy and CRF the speed and direction. Arguably, the lagged 
effect on Adjusted DD might demonstrate the positive effects of increased business 
opportunities on banks’ credit worthiness. It is also logically assumed the lagged correlation of 
lending data to Adjusted DD can be related to Pereira and Rua’s (2018) co-movement of banks’ 
credit tightening versus their DD measure where loan officer opinions are used to illustrate the 
correlation between DD and banks’ lending practices. These opinions are naturally forward 
looking, thus, the effect measured by loan origination will therefore lag in time. Additionally, 
it is curious to observe a reversal effect in the data. As for why this is the case is beyond this 
study, however, market conditions can be a suggested reason. I.e. debt is only available in 
periods of time when risk-averse debt investors and lenders are optimistic about the future.  
Table 1: Aggregate DD versus Rolling 3 month loan origination 
 β S.E. R
2 F/df p-value 
Aggregate DD – 0 Lags  0.0003  0.0003  0.0037  1.2278  0.2686 
α  0.0188  0.0083  334  0.0236 
Aggregate DD - 1 Lag ( 0.0006)  0.0003  0.0141  4.7766  0.0295 
α  0.0175  0.0082  333  0.0346 
Aggregate DD - 2 Lags  0.0001  0.0003  0.0004  0.1182  0.7312 
α  0.0192  0.0083  332  0.0212 
Rolling 3 months Loan Origination US - 0 Lags  11.1523  10.0648  0.0037  1.2278  0.2686 
α ( 1.8033)  1.5325  334  0.2401 
Rolling 3 months Loan Origination US - 1 Lag  21.1288  10.0368  0.0131  4.4316  0.0360 
α ( 1.9848)  1.5294  333  0.1953 
Rolling 3 months Loan Origination US - 2 Lags  22.2541  10.0479  0.0146  4.9053  0.0275 
α ( 2.0053)  1.5326   332  0.1916 
 Aggregate DD versus lagged Rolling 3 months Loan Origination US  
 
0 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 Lag 
ρ  0.0605  0.1146  0.1207 ( 0.0124) ( 0.0493) ( 0.1495)  0.0253 
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3.4. Sample 
The data is collected from the WRDS database relying on Compustat, CRSP and WRDS-
Reuters DealScan. The time range for this research is limited to 1990 to 2017 limited by the 
available data, particularly in relation to interconnectedness. In total 145 503 loan facilities 
were documented of which 65 473 was linked to the eight banks defined in the system 
exceeding 50% of the loan issuance amount identified. The interconnectedness computation 
takes into consideration major M&A events in the relevant period for consistent treatment of 
assets and loan origination. Appendix 1 lists the defined banking system including legacy banks 
used when computing interconnectedness weights. As banks report on a quarterly basis the data 
will not allow for accurately computing DD monthly. Compustat also provided the share prices 
and number of shares outstanding on a daily basis. From this, monthly log returns, drift and 
volatility were computed for the computation of Adjusted DD.  
4. Asset Pricing Model 
The proposed asset pricing model include two factors: the market return in excess of risk free 
(“MKTe”) and CRF. The expected excess return and time series regression is given by the 
following two equations: 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑒 )  = 𝛽𝑖,𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑒 × 𝜆𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖,𝐶𝑅𝐹 × 𝜆𝐶𝑅𝐹𝑡           (7) 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑒 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑒 × 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖,𝐶𝑅𝐹 × 𝐶𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡          (8) 
The CRF beta is expected to be positive yielding a risk premium for firms exposed to the state 
of the financial system. Increased lending activities is describing an economic environment 
where firms face attractive investment opportunities, thus, firms yield higher returns when the 
financial system is strengthening and vice versa. 
4.1. Construction of test portfolios 
The test portfolios are constructed regressing the log returns of the 500 largest firms in the US 
each month. Following, all firms are ranked then sorted, based on CRF and market betas, into 
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5 portfolios each of increasing exposure to the respective beta. All betas are computed on a 
rolling 24 month basis accepting varying risk exposures through time. Subsequently, 25 test 
portfolios are created from the five-by-five set of single sorted beta portfolios. There are 1940 
companies in this sample, however, not all have available return data for the entire period. Thus, 
companies without return data for the past 24 months are excluded when computing portfolio 
returns. Furthermore, the returns are equally weighted.  
Table 2: Test portfolio descriptive statistics 
CRF: Single sorted portfolios                   
  HiCRF 2 Qnt 3 Qnt 4 Qnt LoCRF        
Avg. Return  0.293  0.473  0.398  0.616  0.563        
   Median      0.532       0.911         0.703         1.327         0.934         
S.E.  3.752  5.227  5.783  5.278  3.884        
Skew ( 0.387) ( 0.391) ( 1.087) ( 0.978) ( 0.731)        
Kurtosis  0.945  2.026  5.618  3.083  2.755        
CAPM B  0.598*  1.038*  1.226*  1.106*  0.672*        
CAPM A ( 0.100) ( 0.210) ( 0.409) * ( 0.112)  0.120        
CRF B  0.020*  0.013* ( 0.000) ( 0.012) * ( 0.020) *        
  *p-value < 0.05          
CAPM α       Average excess returns    
 HiCRF 2 Qnt 3 Qnt 4 Qnt LoCRF  HiCRF 2 Qnt 3 Qnt 4 Qnt LoCRF 
HiMkt ( 0.1872) ( 0.2422) ( 0.3417) ( 0.1931) ( 0.0769)   0.292  0.382  0.345  0.454  0.427 
  .0484 .0116 .0001 .0196 .3688         
2 Qnt ( 0.2439) ( 0.2989) ( 0.3985) ( 0.2499) ( 0.1336)   0.292  0.382  0.344  0.453  0.427 
  .0187 .0063 .0001 .0099 .1532         
3 Qnt ( 0.2334) ( 0.2884) ( 0.3879) ( 0.2393) ( 0.1231)   0.338  0.428  0.390  0.499  0.473 
  .0324 .0166 .0010 .0277 .2289         
4 Qnt ( 0.1343) ( 0.1893) ( 0.2888) ( 0.1402) ( 0.0240)   0.422  0.512  0.474  0.583  0.557 
  .2770 .1757 .0392 .2743 .8440         
LoMkt  0.1924  0.1374  0.0379  0.1865  0.3028   0.561  0.650  0.613  0.722  0.696 
  .1526 .3646 .7987 .1750 .0225  *monthly portfolio returns in excess of risk free rate 
              
CRF β       Mkt β      
  HiCRF 2 Qnt 3 Qnt 4 Qnt LoCRF  HiCRF 2 Qnt 3 Qnt 4 Qnt LoCRF 
HiMkt  0.0103  0.0068  0.0002 ( 0.0058) ( 0.0097)   0.7285  0.9484  1.0427  0.9824  0.7656 
  .0000 .0000 .8136 .0000 .0000  .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
2 Qnt  0.0101  0.0066 ( 0.0000) ( 0.0060) ( 0.0100)   0.8142  1.0340  1.1283  1.0680  0.8512 
  .0000 .0000 .9786 .0000 .0000  .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
3 Qnt  0.0100  0.0065 ( 0.0001) ( 0.0061) ( 0.0100)   0.8680  1.0879  1.1822  1.1219  0.9051 
  .0000 .0000 .9561 .0000 .0000  .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
4 Qnt  0.0095  0.0060 ( 0.0006) ( 0.0066) ( 0.0106)   0.8451  1.0650  1.1593  1.0990  0.8822 
  .0000 .0000 .6701 .0000 .0000  .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
LoMkt  0.0096  0.0062 ( 0.0004) ( 0.0064) ( 0.0104)   0.5595  0.7794  0.8736  0.8134  0.5965 
  .0000 .0001 .7803 .0000 .0000   .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
 
Table 2 display the time series descriptive statistics of the test portfolios. Surprisingly, return 
figures are, contrary to expectations, increasing with lower betas. In particular, portfolios sorted 
on market beta appear to be influenced by size as size is decreasing with beta, which is 
consistent through time. This characteristic is not true for the CRF sorted portfolios. However, 
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high and low beta single sorted portfolios are both made up of large companies contrary to 2nd, 
3rd and 4th quintile, which are all comparable with regards to total market capitalisation. Table 
2 also display 15 out of 25 CAPM alphas yield significant statistics implying CAPM being 
insufficient to explain the return structure of these portfolios. Generally, alphas are negative 
except for combinations of low market beta, which has positive alphas.  Moreover, alphas seem 
to be increasing in statistical significance with both CRF and market beta. In terms of 
magnitude, higher alphas tend to increase with market beta. Consequently, firms capturing 
higher market risk also appear to possess additional risk characteristics not detected by the 
market risk factor. The bottom two tables are the times series coefficients and the corresponding 
p-values from the below asset pricing test.  
5. Main asset pricing test 
First, each test portfolio is regressed in time series to estimate the full sample betas. 
Subsequently, the cross-sectional regression of portfolio average returns on the previously 
estimated betas yield excess risk premiums.  
?̅?𝑖
𝑒 = 𝜆𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑒 × 𝛽𝑖,𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑒 +  𝜆𝐶𝑅𝐹 × 𝛽𝑖,𝐶𝑅𝐹 + 𝜖𝑖          (10) 
Table 3: Cross Sectional Regression 
    Χ2 test 
   Intercept   λmkt   λcrf   Statistic   p-value  
 Coefficients   0.6638 ( 0.2103)    
 S.E.   0.1310  0.1389  0.6401  1.0000 
 t Stat   5.0674 ( 1.5138)          
 Coefficients    0.4825    
 S.E.    0.0351  1.8280  1.0000 
 t Stat    13.7556          
 Coefficients   0.6894 ( 0.2382) ( 7.2357)   
 S.E.   0.1176  0.1247  2.7838 0.4962  1.0000 
 t Stat   5.8642 ( 1.9104) ( 2.5992)         
 Coefficients    0.4815 ( 5.8665)   
 S.E.    0.0345  4.3435 1.7706  1.0000 
 t Stat     13.9587 ( 1.3507)     
 
Table 3 show the cross-sectional regression outputs. First, CAPM is found to perform badly 
when allowing for an intercept. However, the second case where theory in forced on the data, 
CAPM yields a significant monthly risk premium of 0.48% (5.45% p.a.). The same procedure 
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is done for the two-factor model. If intercept is allowed, market factor yields a negative excess 
premium, albeit not statistically different from zero. CRF, on the contrary, yields a statistically 
significant and strongly negative risk premium. The alpha is also highly significant at 0.69% 
per month. The story repeats itself once theory is forced on the data fixing intercept to zero. 
The market risk premium is “corrected” to 0.48% per month, however, the CRF is now 
insignificant. The goodness-for-fit plots (5.2.) illustrate the dispersion in the data set.  Contrary 
to the ideal cluster of data point forming a 45-degree line, the predicted versus average excess 
return plots tends towards a flatter line with data point scattered to the sides of the best-fitted 
line. Ultimately, this research finds no evidence to the proposed model in the data and must 
therefore reject the CRF factor. 
Goodness-for-fit Plots 
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6. Limitations 
A significant limitation to this measure of interconnectedness is the neglect of investment 
banking activities. This is mitigated by scaling the interconnectedness by asset size, however, 
it is naïve to argue this fully correct the issue. Moreover, lending is only one out of three 
channels for systemic contagion defined in literature. Hence, it is unlikely this measure will 
capture the full extent of interconnectedness. Financial innovations have allowed banks to 
engage in risk-shifting practices on a wide scale which can have severe implications in the 
financial system, acutely illustrated by the bail-out of AIG during the financial crisis. This 
research is restricted by a narrow definition of the banking system. Thus, further research is 
encouraged to expand the inclusion of other commercial banks and insurance companies. 
Furthermore, data is limited to S&P 500 companies. It is important to be aware of this bias 
towards larger companies as it is reasonable to assume these firms are less dependent on bank 
lending by accessing public debt markets. Moreover, size is identified as a distinct characteristic 
in the constructed portfolios. Thus, inclusion of a wider range of companies is likely to improve 
the data set. Lastly, all asset pricing models are at risk of biased results due to omitted variables. 
This study does not claim to present the ideal asset pricing model accepting the possibility for 
other factors related and unrelated to credit risk also systemically important when describing 
asset price structures. 
7. Additional regressions 
To further investigate the return structure of the 25 test portfolios, Carhart’s (1997) four-factor 
model is used to test an alternative model on the data following the same procedure as the main 
asset pricing test. First the time series betas are estimated followed by the cross-sectional 
regression of the average excess portfolio return run on the estimated betas.  
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Table 4: Time series regression betas – Alternative regression 
Mkt β             HML β         
  HiCRF 2 Qnt 3 Qnt 4 Qnt LoCRF  HiCRF 2 Qnt 3 Qnt 4 Qnt LoCRF 
HiMkt  0.7482 0.9495 1.0224 0.9626  0.7851   0.2261  0.3184  0.2971  0.2012  0.1855 
  .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000  .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
2 Qnt  0.8206 1.0219 1.0948 1.0350  0.8574   0.2813  0.3736  0.3523  0.2564  0.2407 
  .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000  .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
3 Qnt  0.8715 1.0728 1.1458 1.0860  0.9084   0.3518  0.4441  0.4228  0.3269  0.3112 
  .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000  .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
4 Qnt  0.8483 1.0496 1.1226 1.0628  0.8852   0.4336  0.5259  0.5046  0.4087  0.3929 
  .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000  .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
LoMkt  0.5666 0.7679 0.8408 0.7810  0.6034   0.4749  0.5672  0.5459  0.4500  0.4342 
  .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000  .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
            
SMB β      Mom β       
  HiCRF 2 Qnt 3 Qnt 4 Qnt LoCRF  HiCRF 2 Qnt 3 Qnt 4 Qnt LoCRF 
HiMkt (0.0274) 0.0935 0.1732 0.1504  0.0492  (0.0430) (0.0756) (0.0942) (0.0658)  0.0182 
  .3235 .0002 .0000 .0000 .0631  .0222 .0000 .0000 .0000 .3081 
2 Qnt  0.0301 0.1510 0.2308 0.2079  0.1067  (0.0787) (0.1114) (0.1299) (0.1015) (0.0175) 
  .2996 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0001  .0001 .0000 .0000 .0000 .3473 
3 Qnt  0.0982 0.2190 0.2988 0.2760  0.1747  (0.0784) (0.1111) (0.1296) (0.1012) (0.0172) 
  .0008 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000  .0001 .0000 .0000 .0000 .3712 
4 Qnt  0.1929 0.3138 0.3936 0.3707  0.2695  (0.0578) (0.0904) (0.1090) (0.0805)  0.0034 
  .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000  .0081 .0001 .0000 .0002 .8770 
LoMkt  0.2002 0.3211 0.4009 0.3780  0.2768  (0.0573) (0.0899) (0.1085) (0.0801)  0.0039 
  .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000   .0162 .0003 .0000 .0005 .8709 
 
Interestingly, momentum appear to yield negative beta for the 25 test portfolios. The exceptions 
are among portfolios characterising low CRF betas, all of which are statistically insignificant. 
Furthermore, HML betas report consistently higher magnitude in comparison to SMB and all 
factor betas follow similar patterns strengthening in magnitude for combinations of third 
quintile sorted portfolios. Lastly, SMB yield insignificant betas for portfolios of high and low 
CRF betas in combination with high market beta.  
Table 5: Cross sectional regression – Alternative regression 
      Χ
2 test 
   Intercept   λmkt   λsmb λhml λmom Statistic p-value 
Coefficients   0.7307 ( 0.4101)  1.1366 ( 0.2536)  0.4824   
 S.E.   0.0841  0.0816  0.1265  0.1462  0.2960 9.5278 0.9962 
 t Stat   8.6883 ( 5.0255)  8.9825 ( 1.7342)  1.6297           
 Coefficients   0.2479  0.5110  0.7349  2.0594   
 S.E.    0.0648  0.2219  0.1958  0.4985 0.3081 1.0000 
 t Stat     3.8272  2.3031  3.7526  4.1310     
 
When running the cross section of the four-factor model allowing for an intercept, only market 
and SMB yield significant risk premiums in addition to the significant intercept. In line with 
the main asset pricing test, the market yields a negative risk premium of 0.41% per month. 
SMB’s risk premium is reported at 1.14% per month which confirms previous indications of 
size characteristics to be influential in this data set. In the case where intercept is set to zero, all 
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four factors yield a significant risk premium. Momentum yield an abnormal 2.06% per month 
in contrast to HML, SMB and the market factor yielding 0.73%, 0.51% and 0.25% respectively. 
Lastly, the former cross-sectional regression’s strong significance and magnitude of the 
intercept imply yet uncovered risk factors important to explain the asset pricing structure of the 
constructed portfolios. Thus, although all four factors of Carhart’s model yield strong 
significance when forced on the data the intercept suggest this is not sufficient.  
8. Conclusion 
This paper finds strong theoretical foundations for banking interconnectedness and credit risk 
to be tied together. Until recent credit risk has often been treated in isolation with the logical 
implication of no impact on the wider financial ecosystem. However, systemic risk in the 
financial sector is more complex. Thus, treating credit risk and interconnectedness in silos will 
not enable a true representation of risk. Undoubtedly, the positive effects of such measure on 
market discipline and efficient asset pricing are highly attractive when considering the 
aftermath of the last financial crisis. The too-big-to-fail issue regulators, authorities and tax-
payers face can improve in the case where a reliable measure of systemic risk in the financial 
system is developed by imposing market discipline where the market participants bear the costs. 
Thereby, mitigating the need for regulators interfering with markets and unintended 
consequences of regulations. The two strains of literatures are widely studied in separation and 
advanced models for measuring either source of risk has been present for many years. This 
study, inspired by Pereira and Rua (2018) and Cai et al. (2018), combine two successful 
measures of credit risk and interconnectedness. Regretfully, this yielded unsatisfactory results, 
however, limitations to the methods used are several and future research can greatly improve 
either the measure or add to the rational leading to more precise and successful data.  
Regardless, this paper should remain academic and regulatory interest as the motivation of this 
study is well founded in established literature. Moreover, the potential economic benefits of the 
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development of a successful measure combining credit risk and interconnectedness in the 
financial sector should prove sufficient motivating further research in this field.  
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
Appendix 1: Bank Lending institutions 
Bank of America (BoA) Bank of New York Mellon Citibank Goldman Sachs JP Morgan Morgan Stanley State Street Wells Fargo 
BoA International Ltd Bank of New York Citibank Goldman Sachs & Co JP Morgan & Co MS Senior Funding Inc 
State Street Bank & 
Trust Wells Fargo & Co 
BoA National Trust & 
Savings Bank of New York Co Inc [BNY] 
Citicorp Investment 
Bank Ltd (UK) 
Goldman Sachs Credit 
Partners LP JP Morgan Securities Inc MS Dean Witter & Co  Wells Fargo Bank 
BoA Texas Barclays Bank of New York Citicorp 
Goldman Sachs Capital 
Partners JP Morgan Delaware MS Group  
Wells Fargo Realty Advisors 
Funding 
BoA Illinois Mellon Bank Citicorp Savings Goldman Sachs Mtg Co JP Morgan Australia Ltd MS & Co International  Wells Fargo HSBC Trade Bank 
BoA Canada Mellon Bank (East) Citicorp USA Inc  Chase Manhattan Bank MS Mortgage Capital  Wells Fargo - Texas 
BoA Nevada Mellon Bank Canada Citicorp Real Estate  Chase Manhattan Asia Ltd MS Capital Partners  Wachovia Bank 
BoA Oregon Mellon Financial Services Corp 
Citicorp North America 
Inc  Chase Manhattan Bank of Canada MS Dean Witter & Co  
Wachovia Bank of North 
Carolina 
BoA Arizona Mellon Bank Corp 
Citibank International 
Plc  Chase Manhattan Corp 
Dean Witter Realty Yield 
Plus LP  Wachovia Bank of Georgia 
BoA Asia BNY Financial Corp 
Citicorp Securities 
Markets  Chase Manhattan Investment Bank Ltd Dean Witter  
Wachovia Bank of South 
Carolina 
BoA BNY Capital Markets 
Citicorp Savings of 
Florida  Chemical Bank 
Dean Witter Discover & 
Co  Wachovia Corp 
Merrill Lynch & Co Inc 
Israel Discount Bank of New 
York Inc 
Citicorp International 
Plc  Chemical Bank of Canada     
Merrill Lynch Capital Corp BNY Financial Corp (Canada) 
Citicorp Venture 
Capital Ltd  Chemical Bank New Jersey NA     
ML Interfunding 
Bank of New York Commercial 
Corp Citibank of Canada  Chase Securities     
ML Business Financial 
Services Inc  Citicorp Leasing Inc  Chase Commercial Corp     
ML International Bank Ltd    Chase Lincoln First Bank     
ML Capital Markets    Chase Investment Bank Ltd     
ML Capital Partners    Chase Bank of Florida     
ML Business Capital    Chemical Securities     
ML Mortgage Investors    Chemical Securities Asia     
ML International & Co    JPM Co     
Fleet Financial Corp    Bear Stearns Cos     
Fleet Financial Group Inc    Bear Stearns & Co     
BankBoston NA    Morgan Guaranty Trust     
BankBoston Capital    First Chicago NBD Corp     
BankBoston Corp    Manufacturers Hanover Trust     
Fleet Bank NA         
Fleet Bank         
Fleet Bank of Massachusetts         
Fleet Bank of Maine         
Fleet Bank of New York               
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